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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

Case No. 930566-CA

GROVE L. FLOWER,

:

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of a
controlled substance (psilocybin mushrooms), a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (1995) .
This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f) (1995) .

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court properly determine that defendant

voluntarily consented to the search of the gun safe located in
his bedroom?
A trial court's factual findings underlying the
voluntariness of a consent will be set aside only if a reviewing

1

court determines that they are clearly erroneous.

The trial

court's ultimate legal conclusion that a consent is voluntary is
reviewed for correctness.

State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271

(Utah 1993).
2.

Did the trial court properly determine that the search

of the gun safe was sufficiently attenuated from the activities
preceding it, which the court had found to be unlawful?
The same standard of review applies to the issue of
attenuation.

Id.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Any relevant provisions are included in the body of this
brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In September, 1992, defendant was arrested and charged with
one count each of possession of a controlled substance with
intent to distribute (marijuana), possession of a controlled
substance (psilocybin mushrooms), and possession of a dangerous
weapon by a restricted person (R. 8-10).

After a preliminary

hearing, defendant was bound over on the two drug charges to
district court, where he filed a motion to suppress all evidence
he believed had been unlawfully seized (R. 22-23) . After a
hearing in March of 1993, the trial court determined that both a
2

protective sweep of the home and the opening of defendant's lunch
box were unjustified.

The court suppressed all evidence except

that which was found, pursuant to defendant's voluntary consent
to search, in a gun safe in defendant's bedroom (R. 301-04, 31213) .
The next month, the trial judge inadvertantly signed
defendant's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law (R.
82-90, 333-35).

When the State objected, the court held a

hearing, set aside the findings and conclusions, and continued
the matter without date pending the outcome of a federal case
arising out of the same facts (R. 335).
A month later, defendant entered a conditional guilty plea
pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), to one
count of possession of a controlled substance (R. 102-03, 105-11,
347) . The trial court sentenced him to zero to five years in the
Utah State Prison, stayed execution of the sentence, and ordered
him to serve three years on probation, concurrent with his
federal sentence (R. 112-13, 355-56).
Defendant then timely appealed from the trial court's denial
of his motion to suppress the evidence found in the safe (R.
114).

After defendant had filed his brief, however, the parties

realized that no findings or conclusions had ever been entered in
3

the case and so filed a joint motion to remand for entry of
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order (R. 118C-G).
This Court granted the motion and, in April of 1994, the trial
court entered new findings and conclusions (R. 3 07-11 or addendum
A).

Defendant then filed a replacement appellate brief.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In September of 1992, parole officers Street and Metcalf

went to the home of Kevin Kelly, a recent parolee, to investigate
a report of Kelly's possible involvement in a sexual assault (R.
206, 208, 248-49).

Because of the nature of the suspected

offense and Kelly's long criminal history, the officers asked two
other agents, Kennington and Haurand, to accompany them (R.
250) -1
Kelly, visibly bruised around the face and eyes, arrived at
his home just moments after the four officers, at about 2:30 p.m.
Kelly invited the officers inside to talk (R. 151, 152, 155, 171,
192, 210-11).

Upon entering the home, Agents Kennington and

Metcalf went upstairs with Kelly, while Agents Haurand and Street
went downstairs to do a protective sweep (R. 140, 175-76, 188,

1

Officer Metcalf had only supervised Kelly since his
release from prison six days prior to this incident. Haurand had
supervised Kelly on a previous parole (R. 280).
4

211-12, 253). No other persons were found in the home. Within
five minutes, all four officers were upstairs, the sweep competed
(R. 192, 253).
About fifteen minutes later, Agent Street asked Agent
Haurand if he had noticed a set of scales between the bed and
wall in one of the downstairs bedrooms and marijuana residue on
the floor of the closet in the same room (R. 214-15, 218).
Haurand said that he had not (R. 190, 218). Kelly, in response
to a question from Street, then identified defendant as the
occupant of the downstairs bedroom and owner of its contents (R.
219, 281). At this juncture, Agent Kennington initiated two
telephone calls to obtain a search warrant (R. 220-21, 285). The
warrant, however, was never procured (R. 273).
At about 5:00 p.m., defendant, accompanied by his young son,
was dropped off in front of the home (R. 222, 241, 258). Agent
Metcalf approached defendant in the front yard, near where Kevin
Kelly's truck was parked

(R. 222, 259). Metcalf explained what

his fellow agent had seen in the downstairs bedroom and commented
that he would like to know what was in the gun safe.

Defendant

responded that the safe contained an eighth of an ounce of
marijuana and two guns (R. 223, 259). Metcalf then asked if he
could search the safe, and defendant nodded affirmatively,
5

stating either "Yeah" or "Yeah, go ahead" (R. 224, 260). Because
defendant had admitted to having guns, Metcalf pat-searched
defendant for weapons (R. 223, 261, 275-76).
Just prior to the pat-search, defendant had put his lunchbox
down on the hood of Kevin Kelly's truck, and his young son
climbed up on the truck trying to reach it.

Because defendant

became quite protective of the lunchbox and was seeking to keep
his son away from it, Agent Metcalf became suspicious and, when
defendant reached for it, Metcalf took possession of it (R. 22425, 261-62, 272-73).

At that juncture, defendant said, "It's

pot, man" (R. 225, 262, 266). Metcalf opened the lunchbox and
found a half-pound of marijuana inside (R. 263). Defendant was
taken into custody, handcuffed, and ushered inside the home (R.
225, 263).
Once seated in the kitchen, Agent Street read defendant his
Miranda rights.

Defendant said he understood his rights and did

not wish to make a statement (R. 226, 264). Street then asked
defendant if he was still willing to consent to a search of the
safe.

Defendant said that he was and, still handcuffed, reached

around to partially remove some keys from the back pocket of this
pants.

Street took the keys and searched the safe, which

contained two guns, a small quantity of marijuana, psilocybin
6

mushrooms, and a ledger (R. 228, 265, 277) .
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENT
A consent to search given after a police illegality will be
considered valid only if two criteria are met.
consent must be given voluntarily.

First, the

And, second, the consent must

be properly attenuated from the misconduct that preceded it.
The trial court correctly determined that defendant's
consent, given first during the initial encounter with the
officer and later reaffirmed after he had been arrested, was
voluntary.

The totality of the factual circumstances, including

both the characteristics exhibited by defendant and the details
of the police conduct, support the trial court's determination.
There is simply no record evidence of coercion or duress.
As to attenuation, because defendant failed to raise this
issue in the trial court, he is precluded from doing so for the
first time on appeal.

In the trial court, defendant argued that

the security sweep constituted a "poisonous tree," tainting
everything that followed it. He did not engage in any
exploitation analysis nor did he assert that the opening of the
lunch box was an independent "poisonous" factor or that it
affected the consent to search the safe. Attenuation is,
therefore, waived on appeal.
7

But, in any event, an attenuation analysis fails on the
merits.

With the deterrent purposes of the fourth amendment

exclusionary rule in mind, it is clear that excluding the
evidence brought to light by defendant's consent would have a
negligible deterrent effect on future illegalities.

In this

case, the protective sweep was aimed only at the safety of the
officers entering the home of a parolee whom they suspected to
have recently been involved in a violent crime and who had
previously lied to them about the presence of another individual
in his residence.

The sweep was spontaneous, lasted but a few

minutes, and had nothing at all to do with defendant.

In

addition, more than two and a half hours elapsed between the
sweep and the time defendant gave his first unequivocal, totally
cooperative consent.

Later, after defendant had been

"mirandized" and had acknowledged he understood his rights, he
reaffirmed his consent, both verbally and by handing the key to
the safe to the officers. Under the circumstances, the trial
court correctly concluded that both consents were properly
attenuated from the security sweep.

8

PQINT PNE
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY
DETERMINED THAT DEFENDANT
VOLUNTARILY CONSENTED TO THE SEARCH
OF THE GUN SAFE
If a defendant consents to a search after illegal police
activity, that consent will be valid only if two criteria are
met.

First, defendant's consent to the search must be given

voluntarily.

SctfflggklPth v, gUStflfflgnte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49

(1973); State v. Arroyo. 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990).

Unless

the consent is the product of defendant's own free will, it is
invalid.

£££, e,gt SchnecklQth, 412 U.S. at 233; State v,

Whittenback. 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980).

Second, the consent

must not be obtained through police exploitation of the preceding
illegality.

Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688. The exploitation -- or

attenuation -- analysis is triggered only upon a determination
that the consent was voluntarily given.

State v. Thurman. 846

P.2d 1256, 1262 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted).
To determine whether a consent has been given voluntarily,
courts look to the totality of the circumstances, including both
the "characteristics of the accused" and the "details of police
conduct."

Id. at 1262-63 (quoting Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 689 and

9

Schneckloth. 412 U.S. at 226).
Defendant in this case twice voluntarily consented to the
search of the safe.

The first consent occurred in the course of

the initial conversation with Agent Metcalf, shortly after
defendant arrived home with his young son (R. 222-24, 259-60).
Agent Metcalf approached defendant outside the home, identified
himself, explained that the parole officers were at the home to
investigate Kevin Kelly, and that one of the agents had seen
scales, marijuana seeds and residue in front of a safe in the
basement bedroom.

Agent Metcalf then commented that he "sure

would like to know what was in that safe" (R. 223, 259). In
response, defendant replied that the safe contained an eighth of
an ounce of marijuana and a couple of guns (R. 223, 259-60).
After defendant had volunteered this information, Agent Metcalf
asked him if he would allow the agents to look in the safe.
Defendant nodded affirmatively and said, "Yeah" (R. 224, 260).
Examining first "the characteristics of the accused," what
stands out graphically is the fact that defendant was entirely
cooperative, first volunteering information and then responding
in the affirmative to the agent's single request to search.
State v. Whittenback. 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980).

See

Defendant

immediately provided incriminating information to the agents upon
10

a mere indication by Agent Metcalf that he would like to know
what was in the safe. Agent Metcalf did not explicitly ask
defendant what was in the safe; he simply mused aloud that he
would like to know what it contained.

Only after defendant

volunteered that the safe contained guns and marijuana did the
agent ask for consent to look inside. And, at that juncture,
defendant promptly agreed to the request.
As to the conduct of the police, defendant contends that it
"created a coercive atmosphere which would cause any reasonable
person to submit to the officer's show of authority" (Br. of App.
at 16). This assertion, however, is unsupported by both the law
and the facts. At the outset, the mere presence of uniformed
officers at a residence does not constitute an undue show of
authority, as defendant contends (Br. of App. at 15). Plainly,
an officer may approach a citizen at any time and initiate a
conversation.

See, e.g..

Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) .

The trial court recognized this fundamental tenet when it
observed:
They would have approached him when he came up with the
lunch box, and given the fact that he was living there with
Kelly, I think at that juncture they had a right to ask
additional questions, because they probably have a given
purpose in ascertaining that he's living there; he had
anything in the house, and so forth. I don't have any
problem with that.
11

(R. 302).
Additionally, numerous factors indicate a lack of duress or
coercion.
factors).

See Whittenback. 621 P.2d at 106 (listing relevant
First, the agents never asserted any claim of

authority to search.

Agent Metcalf did not mention that another

agent had already initiated the process of obtaining a search
warrant, or that they would be able to search the safe once the
warrant was obtained, regardless of defendant's consent.

Second,

the agents never used force or any exhibition of force to induce
defendant to consent.

Third, the agent made a neutral, unadorned

request to search, unaccompanied by a demand or any other
intimidating innuendo.
cooperative.

Fourth, defendant was entirely

And, fifth, the agents did not engage in any

deception or trickery that would lead defendant to believe that
he had no choice but to consent.

Id.

Additional factors

include the fact that the encounter occurred in front of the home
in which defendant lived, rather than in a more intimidating
atmosphere such as a police cruiser or at the station house.
State v Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1274 (Utah App. 1990).

See

Finally,

while two agents were present during the conversation, only one
agent interacted with him in any way, thus keeping to the
absolute minimum any show of authority.
12

See Whittenback, 621

P.2d at 106.

Looking at all of the circumstances surrounding the

first consent, there is simply no evidence of duress or coercion
and, hence, no credible evidence to support defendant's
contention that the consent was not voluntary.2
Defendant also voluntarily consented a second time to the
search of the safe.

The second consent occurred after defendant

spontaneously told the agents that his lunch box contained
marijuana.3

At that juncture, Agent Metcalf arrested defendant,

2

Defendant also claims that his consent was involuntary
because he was in custody at the time and had not yet received
his Miranda warnings (Br. of App. At 15-16). Miranda warnings
are required only when an individual is subject to custodial
interrogation. Miranda V, Arizona, 394 U.S. 436, 477-78 (1966).
That is, Miranda's safeguards apply "as soon as a suspect's
freedom of action is curtailed to a 'degree associated with
formal arrest."' Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1983)
(quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per
curiam)). In this case, the initial conversation between Agent
Metcalf and defendant had none of the indicia of formal arrest.
Thus, while defendant may have been seized for fourth amendment
purposes, he was not in custody for the fifth amendment purposes
that Miranda was designed to protect. In addition, federal
courts have consistently held that a consent to search is not the
kind of incriminating statement that the fifth amendment was
designed to address. United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia. 983 F2d
1563, 1568 (10th Cir. 1993) (and cases cited therein).
3

Defendant's second consent was merely a reaffirmation of
his first consent. Because the first consent is the critical
one, the trial court's ruling that the lunch box opening was
unlawful becomes irrelevant. That is, the officers opened the
lunch box only after defendant had voluntarily consented to the
search of the safe. Any illegality related to the lunch box
would plainly have no effect on a voluntary consent that preceded
13

and Agent Street handcuffed him (R. 225, 263). The three
proceeded inside to the kitchen, where defendant was seated while
Agent Street read him his Miranda rights (R. 226, 264).4
Defendant invoked his rights (Id.).

After discussing the

appropriateness of reaffirming defendant's consent to search the
safe, Agent Metcalf once again asked defendant if he was still
willing to consent to a search of the safe.

Defendant said

"yes," reached around to his front pocket, removed the keys to
the safe, and turned them over to Agent Street (R. 226-27, 265).
The crux of defendant's argument is that, under the
circumstances of his recent arrest, defendant was "merely
acquiesc[ing] to the will of the agents" because of the
intimidating atmosphere they had created and that he could not,
therefore, voluntarily consent to the search (Br. of App. at 1718).

The law is clear, however, that a recent arrest, merely

accompanied by attendant handcuffing and the presence of

it.
4

Defendant states that his young son was present and
witnessed at least part of the interaction. Although defendant
has not articulated the relevance of this assertion, presumably
it is notable as it might relate to defendant's vulnerability.
£S£ Stfrte Vr Robinson, 797 P.2d at 437 (quoting Schneckloth. 412
U.S. at 229) . The record evidence, however, does not reveal
where defendant's son was at the time defendant gave his second
consent.
14

officers, does not preclude the voluntariness of a consent to a
warrantless search.

See State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1273

(citing Wfrittenfreck, 621 P.2d at 106 n.14 and State v, Boko, 803
P.2d 1268, 1273-74 (UtahApp. 1990)).
Of significance in this instance is the fact that the agent
read defendant his Miranda rights and that defendant acknowledged
he understood their import.

Invoking his rights, defendant knew

that anything he said could be used against him.

Certainly, when

a defendant invokes his right to remain silent, the law does not
impose a concomitant duty on law enforcement officers to also
remain silent.

In this instance, the officers were merely being

scrupulous, ensuring that the consent defendant had previously
given was still good.

Having just warned defendant about his

rights, Agent Street was in effect saying, "I know you already
said we could search the gun safe, but now, knowing what all of
your specific rights are, do you still want to stand by that
consent?"

The invitation was thus directly extended to defendant

to retract his previous consent with a simple wno."

Instead,

however, defendant reaffirmed his earlier consent and reached
around to remove the keys to the safe from his pocket (R. 265).
At no time did he express any hesitation or attempt to stop or
restrict the search in any way.

Defendant's words and conduct
15

thus unequivocally indicated that he was freely consenting to the
search of the safe.

Further, his words and conduct were entirely

consistent with all of his previous behavior, including
volunteering to the officers precisely what was in the safe and
the lunch box, and earlier consenting to the search of the safe.
In this case, the trial court determined that defendant
twice consented to the search of the safe located in his bedroom
and that both consents were voluntarily given.

(See addendum A,

R. 310). While the trial court's findings of fact do not
explicitly spell out the factual basis for the conclusion of
voluntariness, the record is sufficiently detailed and complete
to provide clear support for the court's ultimate determination.
Under such circumstances, this court may determine on the
undisputed facts that the State has met its burden of proving the
voluntariness of both consents.
774, 787-88 n.6 (Utah 1991);

See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d

StStS Vt RokinSCT, 797 P.2d 431,

437 (Utah App. 1990).

16

POINT TWO
BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILED TO
PRESERVE HIS ATTENUATION CLAIM IN
THE TRIAL COURT, HE HAS WAIVED IT
ON APPEAL.
On appeal, defendant argues that his consent to search the
safe was not ''sufficiently attenuated from the illegal sweep and
illegal search of the lunch box" (Br. of App. at 10). Because
this is an entirely new argument presented for the first time on
appeal, it is waived.

State v. Carter. 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah

1985).
In defendant's motion to suppress, he argued that "but for
the initial search [,] the police would never have been led to
confront Mr. Flower and look in his lunch box" (R. 57).
Similarly, in closing argument at the suppression hearing,
defendant focused only on the illegality of the protective sweep,
asserting that it tainted everything that followed it (R. 299,
301-02).

Defendant's trial court argument thus hinged on a fruit

of the poisonous tree "but for" analysis, using the protective
sweep as the poisonous tree (R. 200-302).
The Utah Supreme Court has specifically eschewed the "but
for" test on which defendant relies.

State v. Arroyo. 796 P.2d

684, 688 (Utah 1990)(citing Wona Sun v. United States. 371 U.S.

17

4711, 487-88 (1963)).

That is, all evidence is not "fruit of the

poisonous tree" just because it would not have been found but for
the initial police illegality.

Id.

In some instances, the

legitimate demands of law enforcement will outweigh the deterrent
purposes of the exclusionary rule and evidence will be admissible
despite police misconduct.

Id. (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422

U.S. 590, 608-09 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part)).
The correct test for determining whether such evidence is
admissible involves a two-part inquiry.

The first part, properly

preserved in the trial court and addressed by both parties on
appeal/ centers on whether the consent to search was voluntary.
The second part examines whether the voluntary consent was
properly attenuated from the police misconduct that preceded it.
Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688. Defendant, however, wholly failed to
address the attenuation analysis in the trial court.
Defendant's new appellate counsel, recognizing the flaw in
trial counsel's analysis, presents an attenuation argument for
the first time in this appeal, arguing not only that the initial
consent must be attenuated from the protective sweep, but also
that the second consent must be attenuated from both the sweep
and the opening of the lunch box.
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These arguments, however, have been waived both in whole and
in part.

As a whole, defendant never addressed attenuation in

the trial court.

Notably, the trial court's findings of fact and

conclusions of law were the sole focus of a joint motion to
remand, which this Court granted (R. 118C-G).

On remand, if

defendant believed there was a need for a further attenuation
analysis or that the findings and conclusions did not properly
represent the ruling of the court, he should have pointed that
out to the trial court.
argument in part.

Defendant also waived his attenuation

In the trial court, he focused only on the

security sweep, arguing that it constituted a

"poisonous tree"

that tainted everything that followed it. He never argued that
the lunch box was an independent "poisonous" factor or that it,
in any way, affected the consent to search the safe (R. 50-63,
299-303) .
The law is well-settled that "with limited exceptions, the
practice of this court has been to decline consideration of
issues raised for the first time on appeal."

Espinal v. Salt

Lake City Bd. Of Educ.. 797 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1990).

Absent

exceptional circumstances or plain error, neither of which have
been asserted here, defendant waives consideration of issues
presented for the first time on appeal.
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State v. Gibbons. 740

P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987).

For these reasons, this Court

should decline to consider defendant's attenuation claim.

POINT THREE
DEFENDANT'S CONSENT TO SEARCH THE
SAFE WAS PROPERLY ATTENUATED FROM
THE PROTECTIVE SWEEP OF THE HOME
In any event, should this Court choose to consider
defendant's belated attenuation argument, it would fail on the
merits.

When a consent is voluntary, as here, the other

necessary inquiry to determine its validity is "whether the
consent was obtained by police exploitation of the prior
illegality."

Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688.

If the consent was

obtained through such exploitation, the resulting evidence will
be inadmissible because the primary goal underlying attenuation
is "to deter the police from engaging in illegal conduct even
though that conduct may be followed by a voluntary consent to the
subsequent search."

Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1263.

In this case, the trial court determined that the protective
sweep of the home was not justified (R. 301, 310).5

5

Therefore,

The trial court did not explain the rationale for its
conclusion that the security sweep was unjustified. On its face,
the decision seems aberrant. See, e.g., Maryland v. Buie. 494
U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 1094 (1990); State v. Velasquez. 672
P.2d 1254, 1260 (Utah 1983); State v. Johnson. 748 P.2d 1069,
1072 (Utah 1987). Similarly, because defendant's statement,
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for defendant's first consent to search the safe to be
admissible, it must be properly attenuated from the unlawful
protective sweep of the home.6

The relationship between the two

events is examined closely "to determine if excluding the
evidence will effectively deter future illegalities."

State v.

Shoulderblade. 276 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 27 (Utah 1995) (citations
omitted).

A proper attenuation analysis "requires a balancing of

"It's pot, man" provides the necessary probable cause to search
the lunchbox, the trial court's ruling on that matter may also
constitute legal error.
6

Because the State did not cross-appeal the trial court's
ruling suppressing the scales and the marijuana residue
discovered during the protective sweep, it cannot contest the
suppression of that evidence at this late date. See generally
Terry v. Zions Co-op. Mercantile Inst., 617 P.2d 700 (Utah 1980).
However, the law is well-settled that this Court may affirm on
any alternative grounds. See, e.g.. State v. Gray. 717 P.2d
1313, 1316 (Utah 1986) . Consequently, this Court may consider
the correctness of the trial court's conclusion that the security
sweep was unlawful in the context of the subsequent consent and
search of the safe. £££. generally Buehner Block Co. V. UWC
Assocs.. 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988); State v. Gallegos. 712
P.2d 207, 208-09 (Utah 1985). If this Court determines that,
based on the uncontroverted record facts, the trial court
committed legal error in concluding that "the sweep was not
justified," then an attenuation analysis would be rendered
unnecessary (R. 310 or addendum A ) . This Court could then affirm
the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress evidence found
in the safe simply on the basis that defendant voluntarily
consented to the search. In this way, evidence suppressed by the
trial court would remain suppressed, while the evidence admitted
by the trial court would be justified on alternative grounds.
Similarly, if this Court finds any relevance in the opening of
the lunchbox, it could apply a similar analysis to that matter.
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the relative egregiousness of the misconduct against the time and
circumstances that intervene before the consent is given."
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1264. The analysis considers three factors.
First, this Court examines "the purpose and flagrancy of the
official misconduct."

Arroyo. 796 P.2d at 691 n.4 (citing Brown

v. Illinois. 422 U.S. at 603-04 (1975)).

This factor alone, in

some instances, may be dispositive. State v. Zieaelman. 276 Utah
Adv. Rep. 56, 58 (1995)(citing Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1264).

In

this case, the stated purpose of the protective sweep was to
ensure the safety of the officers entering the home to
investigate the crime in which they suspected Kevin Kelly had
been involved.7

All four officers who were present testified

about the purpose of the sweep.

Officer Haurand, Kevin Kelly's

parole supervisor, stated:
Having known Mr. Kelly's prior lies at home
visits that nobody is in the residence, we
weren't sure about our safety or his safety,
going in there with him, so we did split up.
And we wanted to sweep the home to make sure
there weren't any other people inside the
house.

7

The officers were particularly concerned about entering
Kelly's residence because of their previous experience with him.
On a prior parole, Kelly had told two of the officers that no one
else was in his residence. When the officers conducted a
security sweep, however, they discovered another individual in
the home (R. 128, 153, 157, 168-69).
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(R. 175). Officer Haurand entered a downstairs bedroom, noticed
an open closet that angled down under a staircase, walked over to
it, and "poked [his head] into this closet" (R. 188). He stated
that he did so in order to look for "people," specifically "an
assailant." (R. 188-89).

Officer Street elaborated on the

reasons the officers initiated the security sweep:
Having already known the nature of the
allegations against Mr. Kelly, viewing his
person and the obvious trauma about the
person, and also having his prior record in
mind, and incidents on prior paroles, we
believed it in the best interest of all
involved to verify who was and was not in the
residence at that time.
(R. 211).
The security sweep was a spontaneous event, lasting less
than five minutes (R. 253). Officer Kennington stated that up
until the time Kelly invited the four officers inside, no one had
mentioned any formal plan for a security sweep. As the officers
entered the home, however, they decided to split up, make a quick
sweep of the premises, and then meet in the kitchen to further
investigate the sexual assault that had prompted their visit in
the first place (R. 140-41).

The Utah Supreme Court has noted

that "the utility of applying the exclusionary rule to deter
police misconduct would be of less value where circumstances
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require prompt, unplanned action."
Rep. at 29.

Shoulderblade, 276 Utah Adv.

The uncontroverted record evidence here supports the

security sweep as just such an action.
Under these factual circumstances, it is difficult to see
how suppression of evidence related to defendant would deter the
police conduct that the trial court found unlawful.

Indeed, the

purpose of the security sweep was wholly unrelated to defendant.
The officers not only were not focused on defendant, they had no
idea he even lived there.8
As to the flagrancy of the police misconduct, it certainly
was not glaringly abusive.

No evidence suggests that the

security sweep was ua pretext for collateral objectives'7 or that
"the purpose of the misconduct was to achieve the consent."
Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1264.

Indeed, the police conduct here was

about as close to the line of permissibility as possible.

In a

federal firearms case arising out of the same factual
circumstances, the trial court determined that the same security
sweep was lawful and admitted all of the evidence that was

8

When the protective sweep was conducted, the agents
believed that "the residence was Mr. Kelly's and his wife's," as
Kelly had stated in his parole agreement a week earlier (R. 27879). Kelly only mentioned that defendant lived in the home after
the agent stated that he had noticed contraband in a downstairs
bedroom (R. 278).
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suppressed in this case.9

The "purpose and flagrancy" prong thus

points strongly towards proper attentuation and, consequently,
the validity of the consent.
A reviewing court next examines the second and third prongs
of the attenuation analysis.

The second prong is the time lapse

between the unlawful police conduct and the consent to search.
Id.. at 1274. Temporal proximity has sometimes been termed the
least probative factor in an attenuation analysis because it does
not provide critical insight into the relationship between the
events.

Therefore, unlike purpose and flagrancy, temporal

proximity alone cannot establish exploitation.
276 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28.

Shoulderblade.

Considered in conjunction with the

purpose and flagrancy prong, however, the time lapse indicates
proper attenuation.

Thurman, £,47 P. 2d at 1264.

Here, there was a substantial break in time.

The officers

arrived at the home at about 2:30 p.m. (R. 152, 191, 231). The
security sweep was completed by 2:40 p.m. (R. 192). Defendant
arrived home between 5:00 and 5:30 p.m.

9

Shortly thereafter, he

£££ United States v. Flower. No. 93-CR-19-A (D.Ct. Utah
decided April 1, 1993) at 7-8 (unpublished order denying
defendant's motion to suppress). The published opinions in this
case from the federal district court and tenth circuit court
focus on federal firearms charges and do not address the legality
of the protective sweep.
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consented to the search of the safe (R. 231, 258). And not long
afterwards, he reaffirmed his consent (R. 228, 265). In Thurman,
the time lapse, which the Supreme Court found indicated proper
attenuation, was five hours.

Id. at 1274.

In that case,

however, the initial illegality was quite egregious, with six
officers, guns drawn, ramming down defendant's front door after a
magistrate had specifically rejected their request for a no-knock
warrant.

Id. at 1258.

In that case, plainly, a more lengthy

time lapse would be necessary to dissipate the taint created by
the police conduct.

Id. at 1264. Here, however, the protective

sweep that the trial court found to be unlawful had no earmarks
of flagrant or egregious misconduct.

Thus, temporal proximity is

a less critical component of proper attenuation.

Even so, two-

and-a-half hours constitutes a substantial time break, indicating
proper attenuation under the circumstances of this case.
The final factor to be considered is the presence or absence
of any intervening circumstances relevant to attenuation.

If

these circumstances substantially separate the consent from the
preceding illegality, then the deterrent value of suppressing the
evidence will be negligible. X£. In Thurman. the court looked to
the facts that defendant had received Miranda warnings, that he
was released from handcuffs at the time he consented, and that he
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was informed of his right to consent.

Id. at 1274.

In this case, prior to the initial consent defendant
volunteered plainly incriminating statements to the officers.
When defendant first arrived home, Officer Metcalf approached
him, told him what had been seen in the downstairs bedroom, and
mused aloud that "he sure would like to know what was in that
safe" (R. 259). Defendant at that point offered that the safe
contained guns and marijuana.

Defendant's own conduct thus

consitutes a significant intervening factor.
In addition, prior to reaffirming his consent, defendant was
given his Miranda warnings, which he verbally acknowledged that
he understood.

After defendant invoked his rights, he was

specifically afforded a clear opportunity by the agents to
withdraw his previously-given consent.

Instead of withdrawing

it, however, he verbally and through his unequivocal conduct
reaffirmed his consent.

And, in contrast to the five hours

preceding Thurman's consent, where Thurman was "essentially
shackled," defendant here was physically unrestrained and free to
move about during the time preceding his formal arrest.

The

presence of relevant intervening factors, therefore, also
indicates proper attenuation.
In sum, even though the trial court held that the protective
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sweep was illegal, defendant's subsequent consent to search and
his later reaffirmation of that consent were sufficiently removed
from the protective sweep so as not to invalidate the search of
the safe in his bedroom.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
conviction for possession of a controlled substance.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this frd day of January, 1996.
JAN GRAHAM
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.

:
CaseNo.921901772FS

GROVE L. FLOWER,

:
Judge John A. Rokich

Defendant.

:
FTNPINGS OF FACTS

1. On or about September 14, 1992, Adult Probation and Parole Agent
Arthur Street received a complaint that a parolee by the name of Kevin Kelley had been
involved in an aggravated sexual assault. Mr. Street contacted Keliey's parole officer
Steve Metcalf and they decided to go to Mr. Keliey's address to conduct a home visit.
Agents Street and Metcalf were joined by Agents Hauraund and Kennington who had
previously supervised Kelley while he was on parole.
2.

Agents Hauraund and Kennington had conducted a previous home visit

with parolee Kelley on February 24, 1992. At the beginning of this home visit Kelley
was asked by the agents if anyone else was in the house. Kelley denied having anyone in
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the house with him. The agents heard noises from a back bedroom and discovered a man
hiding in the back bedroom. This incident was resolved without any violence.
3.

Parolee Kelley had a past history of violent criminal behavior including

aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault charges. Kennington, Hauraund, Metcalf
and Street knew that Kelley had hidden a person at his residence before and had lied
about the person to the parole agents, they also knew that Kelley had a past record of
violence. Kelley's parole agreement provided that the agents could search his residence if
they had reasonable suspicion that a probation violation had been committed by Kelley.
4.

Parolee Kelley had reported to the Parole Department that the only

persons living at his residence at 4256 South 4940 West was his wife, Donna Kelley. The
agents had no knowledge on September 14, 1992, that any other persons lived in the
house.
4(a). In actuality, Kelley was renting a room from Grove Flower.
5. The Parole Agents went to Kelleyfs house at 4256 South 4940 West in
Salt Lake County on September 14, 1992. Upon arrival Agents Metcalf and Street
approached the front door while agents Hauraund and Kennington went around back to
prevent anyone from leaving through a back exit.
6. While in the back of the residence agents Hauraund and Kennington
noticed a Pit Bull Terrier on the back yard of the residence. The Pit Bull would run to the
back door. The Pit Bull did this several times causing Agents Kennington and Hauraund
to believe that someone may have been in the house. Agents Street and Metcalf had
knocked on the front door of the house and had received no response.
7. Kelley arrived at the house a few minutes after the agents had knocked
on the door. Kelley had obviously been in a physical confrontation, he had a black eye
and a laceration on the back of his head. The agents identified themselves and the reason
for their visit. Kelley asked if they could talk about this inside the house away from the
view of the neighbors and invited the agents inside the house. When the agents and
2
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view of the neighbors and invited the agents inside the house. When the agents and
Kelley arrived at the front door the agents asked Kelley if anyone was in the house and he
indicated he didn't think so but that he was not sure.
8. Agents Kennington and Metcalf accompanied Kelley upstairs while
Agents Street and Hauraund testified that they proceeded downstairs to conduct a
protective sweep. They did not discuss the protective sweep among themselves.
9. During the protective sweep Agent Street observed a set of scales with
marijuana residue on them and a gun locker with marijuana residue in front of it in the
downstairs south east comer bedroom. Agent Hauraund had not observed the residue or
scales in his sweep of the room and closet. Agent Street entered the bedroom after Agent
Hauraund had already looked in the room.

Agent Hauraund observed a box of

ammunition in the kitchen area upstairs.
10. After the protective sweep was finished the agents asked Kelley who
was using the Southeast basement bedroom. He replied that it was used by Grove
Flower. The agents made telephone calls about obtaining a search warrant.
11. At approximately 5:15 p.m., Grove Flower was dropped off at the
residence by a vehicle. Agents Street and Metcalf were on the porch when Flower arrived
home. They met Flower on the front yard and identified themselves and explained the
reason for their visit.
12. Agent Metcalf told Mr. Flower about finding the safe, scales and
marijuana residue and mentioned "I sure would like to know what's in the safe." Mr.
Flower responded by saying Til tell you there is an eighth ounce of marijuana and some
guns in the safe. Agent Metcalf asked permission to search inside the safe and Flower
gave him permission to search.
13. Given the fact that Flower had indicated that he owned firearms Agent
Metcalf determined to do a Terry frisk on Flower. During the Terry frisk Flower set
down a lunch pail on the hood of Kelley's truck. After setting the lunch pail down
3
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Flower's son attempted to take the lunch box and Flower grabbed the lunch box in a
protective fashion. Agent Metcalf took the lunch box and Flower stated "It's pot man."
At that time Metcalf opened the lunch box and discovered it to contain one-half pound of
marijuana.
14. Flower was placed under arrest and was taken into the house. Where he
was Mirandized. Flower invoked his Miranda Rights. Flower was asked if he would
consent to a search of his safe, he gave his consent and reached into his pocket to retrieve
a key to the safe. The agents terminated their efforts to obtain a search warrant.
15. When the safe was opened two firearms, one-eighth ounce marijuana,
psylocybin mushrooms, money and a ledger were found.
From the foregoing Findings of Facts the Court makes the following
conclusion of law.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court finds that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to

believe that there was another individual in the house which posed a danger to them and
therefore the protective sweep was not justified. The scales and marijuana fragments
found during the protective sweep are suppressed.
2.

The officers search of the defendant's lunch box was not a valid Terry

search nor was it a valid search incident to arrest. The contents of the lunch box are
suppressed.
3.

The initial consent given by the defendant to search the safe when he

was contacted in the front yard of the house was sufficiently attenuated from the
protective sweep and was voluntary. The subsequent consent given by the defendant after
his arrest and after his Miranda rights had been given to him was attenuated from the
protective sweep and was voluntary. The search of the safe was a valid consent search

4
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and the contents of the safe are not suppressed.
DATED this /(J

day of M 3 r cC^

, 1994.

BY THE COURT

The!:Honorable John A. Rokich
""Sfedge of The Third District Court
Approved as to form:

Counsel for Defendant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs.

CaseNo.921901772FS

GROVE L. FLOWER,
Judge John A. Rokich
Defendant.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, and good
cause appearing therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

The scales and marijuanafragmentsfound during the protective sweep

are suppressed;
2.

The marijuana found in the lunch box is suppressed;

3.

The firearms, marijuana, psylocybin mushrooms, money and ledger

found in the safe are not suppressed.
DATED this Jj_ day of /VlthecH

1994.

BY THE COURT:

Tha Honorable John a. Rokich
utfge of The Third District Court
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